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Summary
This paper is an empirical study of pricing in the Dutch mortgage market. For a narrowly deﬁned
set of endowment mortgages (with a ﬁxed lending rate of 10 years), we ﬁnd that the price dis-
persion within lenders is larger than the dispersion across lenders. Prices remain dispersed across
lenders, even after controlling for characteristics of the borrower, the municipality and the gov-
ernment bond rate. Apparently, the mortgage market is not fully transparent, which impedes
competition in the mortgage market. We also ﬁnd that the price dispersion for mortgages sold by
banks is smaller than that for mortgages sold by other lenders. A likely explanation is that lend-
ers using middlemen have higher agency costs.
Key words: agency costs, lender-borrower matched data, mortgage market, price dispersion, search
costs
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper is an empirical study of the transparency of the Dutch mortgage
market and in particular of transparency in relation to the role of mortgage
brokers or middlemen. Transparency is an important issue, as a lack of it
impedes competition in the mortgage market. The paper is in line with ear-
lier literature on competition in the Dutch loan market (e.g. Den Butter et al.
(1977); Fase (1995); Swank (1995); Toolsema (2002)). The paper of Den But-
ter et al. (1977) is partly related to the present one, as it gives an econometric
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model of the Dutch mortgage market with a demand and interest setting
equation. Fase (1995) focuses on the uncertainty of measuring the loan rate
and concludes that his empirical analysis supports the intuitive feeling that
the rate of interest for bank credit is of great importance as instrument to
control aggregate credit supply. Swank (1995) concludes that the mortgage
market still has an oligopolistic structure in the Netherlands, although com-
petition has intensiﬁed signiﬁcantly in recent years. Toolsema (2002), on the
other hand, ﬁnds indications for perfect competition among banks in the
Dutch consumer credit market.
Our empirical analysis is based on a simple model. Because of imperfect
information about lending rates, consumers have to incur search costs. Con-
sequently, lending rates may become dispersed across lenders, even when the
mortgages are homogeneous. In addition to consumer’ search costs, lenders
may incur agency costs as they have imperfect information on the creditwor-
thiness of borrowers. Banks may have lower agency costs than other lenders
(insurers and pension funds), especially when borrowers have been their cli-
ents for an extended period of time. Imperfect information renders mortgage
markets less transparent; the size of dispersion in lending rates across lenders
gives an indication of the lack of transparency of a market.
This paper can be considered as a follow-up study of Fase (1995), who states
explicitly that lending rates may be dispersed across households. This paper
introduces a new type of analysis of the Dutch mortgage market, by performing
an empirical study of dispersion of the lending rate within and across mortgage
suppliers. We are able to exploit a data set that contains administrative infor-
mation on lending rates. We measure price dispersion for a homogeneous set
of mortgages for residences (endowment mortgages with a ﬁxed lending rate
for 10 years) across lenders (banks, insurers and pension funds) for an extended
period (January 1996 – September 2001). In addition, we focus on a market
segment for which the borrowers are rather homogeneous with respect to risk
and quality of the mortgage. Our data are from mortgages in the lower seg-
ment of the Dutch mortgage market and pertain to borrowers who acquired
insurance against default risk from the Dutch National Mortgage Guarantee
(NMG). The mortgages may not be used to reﬁnance the home. As we focus on
a homogeneous type of mortgage for a speciﬁc market segment, the advantage
of our empirical analysis is that measurement problems do seem more remote
than they usually are in related studies.
We ﬁnd that lending rates are highly dispersed across lenders and that the
within-lender dispersion across borrowers is somewhat smaller. From these
ﬁndings, we conclude that the mortgage market is not transparent. Prices
remain dispersed after controlling for the government bond rate and charac-
teristics of the individual borrower and the region. We ﬁnd that prices at the
lender level are more dispersed for mortgages sold by insurers and pension
funds than for mortgages sold by banks. This result may be due to imperfect
MEASURING TRANSPARENCY IN THE DUTCH MORTGAGE MARKET 25
information of borrowers (difference in transparency) and on the side of lend-
ers (difference in agency costs between types of lender).
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a theoretical back-
ground and describes the empirical model. Section 3 provides detailed infor-
mation on the data set used. Section 4 examines the variation of the lending
rates across borrowers and lenders over time. Section 5 gives the estimates.
Section 6 concludes.
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
Our starting point is the set up of Fase (1995), who models the demand for
short-term bank credit at the macro level. The model of Fase (1995) contains
three equations; the ﬁrst is a demand equation, in which the stock of out-
standing bank credit depends on (transformations of) the volume of expected
sales, the yield on long-term government bonds and the (unobserved) lending
rate of the bank loan. Second, his model contains a lending rate-setting equa-
tion, which has as explanatory variables the cost of capital and capital mar-
ket conditions, because lenders operate in an oligopolistic setting. Basically,
the lending rate for short-term bank loans depends on
r∗ =g(M), (1)
where r∗ is the unobserved lending rate at the macro level and M is a vec-
tor of variables (transformations of the discount rate, the yield obtainable on
alternative earning assets and the proportion of short-term deposits of the
domestic sector in the banking system’s total liabilities). Equation (1) is a
macro equation, which relates aggregate phenomena in the capital market to
price setting of banks (see also Swank (1995)). Fase (1995) includes in his
model inﬂuences at the household level on the lending rate at the macro level.
He thereto introduces a third equation that contains idiosyncratic effects on
the lending rate that result from differences in lending opportunities among
individual households.
Our empirical model for the mortgage market is based on the same princi-
ples, but the emphasis is reversed. In explaining the lending rate of mortgages,
the major focus of our empirical model is on speciﬁc inﬂuences of individual
lenders and borrowers in particular while allowing for macro inﬂuences. In
this way, we are able to analyse empirically the dispersion of mortgage lend-
ing rates across lenders. We follow Fase (1995) by modelling a zone around
the unobserved mortgage rate (r∗j )
rj = r∗ +uj , (2)
where r is the observed mortgage lending rate. Subscript j refers to the j th
household. The spread of the zone is captured by the variation of u, which is
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an identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) error term with expected
value of zero.
We extend equations (1) and (2) in the following way. First, equation (1) is
modelled parsimoniously, by including a bond rate at the date of transaction
of the mortgage (rb), for which the maturity is equal to that of the mortgage
(i.e. both have the same ﬁxed term). It serves as a benchmark, as it is an inter-
est rate without the normal risks of a mortgage. It can also been interpreted
as an approximation of the opportunity costs of lending a mortgage instead
of investing in the market for government bonds. In this respect, we follow
Den Butter et al. (1977) and Swank (1995), who include the bond rate in
the lending rate equation. Second, we allow for the possibility that mortgage
lenders may ask for different lending rates for individual borrowers as observ-
able borrower characteristics reﬂect differences in risk. Hence, equations (1)
and (2) become
rj =γ rb +β ′Xj +vj , (3)
where uj = β ′Xj + vj . Xj is a vector of observable characteristics of the
household, the home and the regional home market. Sub-section 5.1 moti-
vates these variables in further detail. γ is a parameter; β is a vector of
parameters related to X; v is an i.i.d. error term with standard deviation σv.
We extend equation (3), by allowing for differences in lending rate across
lenders, which will be motivated below. The lending rate equation becomes
rij =αi +γ rb +β ′Xij +vij , (4)
where subscript i refers to the ith lender; αi is a lender-speciﬁc effect. The
standard deviation of αi is referred to as σa . It is a measure of the between-
lender variation of the lending rate, conditional on rb and the vector X. We
will explore the variation of αi in greater detail below.
2.1 Transparency of the Market
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate dispersion of the lending rate
across lenders, as it is informative about the transparency in the mortgage
market. The variation of αi across lenders will be limited when there are no
consumers’ search costs and the mortgages in equation (4) are homogeneous
(for similar mortgages with a lending rate for the same ﬁxed term). In that
case, variation, if any, is likely to be small and limited to differences in oper-
ating costs across lenders.
There is a vast literature that explains the equilibrium price dispersion
for homogeneous products by differences in consumers’ search costs. When
all consumers have equal search costs, then the equilibrium is the monop-
oly price (Diamond, 1971). However, when consumers are heterogeneous with
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respect to their search costs, there will be an equilibrium price distribution
(e.g. Salop and Stiglitz (1977); Lach (2002)). It is expensive for borrowers to
get an exhaustive overview of the lending rates for all lenders that operate
on the mortgage market. Generally, consumers are no experienced buyers of
mortgages; it is expensive to learn through frequent transactions from which
lender to purchase at the lowest lending rate. We argue that there are no indi-
cations that borrowers have equal search costs, which implies that lending
rates may be dispersed due to a lack of transparency of the mortgage market.
2.2 Middlemen
Next, we consider the role of middlemen and their inﬂuence on transparency
in the mortgage market. Basically, there are two types of information
channels in the Dutch mortgage market. As in other countries, banks, insur-
ance companies and pension funds are suppliers at the Dutch mortgage mar-
ket (Merriken, 1988). A striking difference between insurance companies and
pension funds on the one hand and banks on the other is the distribution
channel used to sell mortgages. Insurers and pension funds sell mortgages
mainly through middlemen, whereas banks sell relatively more by direct face-
to-face contacts at the desk. De Haas, et al. (2000) ﬁnd that in 1999 large
banks used middlemen as a distribution channel for only 20% of their trans-
actions in mortgages. For small banks, this percentage was at most 70%.
According to NERA (1999), insurers distribute up to 79% of their products
through intermediary channels, such as afﬁliated agents, brokers and even
banks (10%).
One could argue that middlemen increase the transparency in the mort-
gage market, so that dispersion of the lending rate across lenders is limited.
Middlemen may provide borrowers with information about lending rates for
a large part of the lending market (insurance companies, pension funds and
banks), thus forcing mortgage lenders towards limited price dispersion across
lenders. Hence, we would expect that dispersion in the mortgage market can-
not be very large.
However, there are two major drawbacks to the use of middlemen. First,
middlemen may be disinclined to provide exhaustive information on lending
rates because of bonuses, provisions and discounts they may receive from cer-
tain lenders. As a consequence, price dispersion of lenders that make use of
middlemen is likely to increase.
Second, banks may have more extensive and adequate information about
borrowers than middlemen. It is more difﬁcult to screen borrowers for cred-
itworthiness through middlemen than by means of face-to-face contact at the
desk. Middlemen provide limited information about the borrower, while lend-
ers who meet clients at the desk are able to acquire more speciﬁc information.
A bank may also have access to additional information about the borrower
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if that person has been the bank’s client (e.g. by having an account or a
credit card) for an extended period. The testable implication is that σa will
be smaller for banks that make use of additional information channels than
for insurers and pension funds that make use of middlemen only1.
2.3 Homogeneous Mortgages
We will consider dispersion of the lending rate for a set of homogeneous
mortgages. This refers both to the ﬁxed-term of the lending rate and to the
type of mortgage. An additional complication is that there may exist a lack
of homogeneity, due to the lapse of time between the offer of the ﬁxed lend-
ing rate and the formal signing of the mortgage contract at the notary. How-
ever, offers of ﬁxed lending rates usually contain a clause to the effect that the
lending rate at the date of signing the contract will be entered in the mort-
gage contract in case of an intervening decrease in the ofﬁcial lending rates.
Usually, these changes are due to developments in the capital market, which
can be measured by changes in the rates of government bonds. Hence, lend-
ing rates may be contaminated by measurement error in times of an increase
in the ofﬁcial mortgages rates of lenders, as they may refer to the lending rate
offered some months ago, for which the dates differ across borrowers. In con-
trast, the lending rates in periods of price decrease are free from measurement
error, since they refer to the lending rate at the transaction date of the mort-
gage loan.
3 DATA
Our empirical analysis is based on a speciﬁc part of the Dutch mortgage mar-
ket, as we make use of data provided by the NMG (‘Nationale Hypothe-
ek Garantie’). This guarantee was set up by the Dutch government in the
mid-1990s in order to stimulate homeownership for the lower segment of
the Dutch home market. In the Netherlands, homebuyers may opt to insure
the risk of default with the NMG. They pay a small insurance premium
(0.15% of the mortgage loan) at the date of transaction of the mortgage and
receive a discount on their lending rate in return (0.2–0.5 percentage points),
since they pose no risk of default to the mortgage provider. Thus, the risk
of default is covered by the NMG, but the repayment and prepayment risks
remain for the lender. The criteria of eligibility for this guarantee are not
stringent2. The value of the mortgage had to be below 420 thousand guil-
1 This is an indirect way of testing the role of middlemen. We have no additional informa-
tion about middlemen to test the hypothesis directly.
2 These criteria are more stringent than the criteria for mortgages usually set by lenders. The
maximum size of the mortgage loan depends on the gross income of both the head of the
household
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ders in 2000 and 2001 and the loan-to-value ratio could not exceed 88%3,4.
Thus, our analysis concentrates on the lower segment of the Dutch mortgage
market.
The NMG provides a guarantee against the risk of default. In case of
default of the homeowner, the NMG is liable for the remaining debt. The
NMG will make arrangements with the homeowner to pay back this sum to
the NMG over an extended period of time. Between 1995 and 2001, about
393,000 households obtained an NMG guarantee, 194 of which (about 0.05%)
defaulted in those years. In the same period, the guarantee of the NMG
gained a nearly countrywide coverage5. The potential market share is based
on the value of the home, taking into account the additional costs that have
to be made to acquire the home and that must be ﬁnanced by mortgages.
The NMG estimated that in 1997 25% of the total mortgage market actually
acquired an NMG guarantee. In 2001, this percentage had increased to 26%
(NHG, 2002).
We have access to data from the NMG over the period January 1995 –
October 2001. Our data set contains all transactions of homeowners who
received the guarantee by the NMG in this period. The NMG data have an
administrative purpose as they were used to assess the eligibility of individual
households. Each case contains information on the borrower’s characteristics,
which includes gross annual income (distinguished by head of household and
partner), address of the home, all necessary aspects of the mortgage contract
(name of mortgage lender, lending rate, type of mortgage, size of the loan
and date of transaction), and some household characteristics (date of birth
of head of household and partner, type of home and number of homeown-
ers). The date of transaction of the mortgage loan is the ﬁrst day on which
the borrower starts paying interest payments to the lender.
We linked our data on households with two other data sets, i.e. a data set
pertaining to the municipality and data with daily information on the 10-year
government bond rate6. The municipality data are collected by Statistics
Netherlands and were available for 1999 only7. We used municipality-level
information on the population density, the number of inhabitants in the
municipality and the average value of homes in a municipality as used by
Footnote 2 Continued
and the partner. Furthermore, the maximum size depends on the value of the home (NMG,
2002).
3 In 2002, the NMG required that a maximum of 28–37% of gross income (depending on
household income and interest rate) may be attributed to spending on housing.
4 1 Dutch Guilder (Gld.) is worth 0.45 euros.
5 A few large communities joined the NMG during our period of investigation: Groningen
in January 1999, Rotterdam in January 2000 and Arnhem mid-2001. The NMG reached full
countrywide coverage in 2001.
6 Statistics Districts and Neighbourhoods 1999.
7 Except for the average WOZ value, which is available for 1st January 1995.
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the tax authorities (in Dutch: ‘WOZ-waarde’). The value used by the tax
authorities is on average considerable lower than the market value. The data
on daily information on the 10-year government bond rate are collected by
Dutch Central Bank, which is matched using the transaction date of the
mortgage loan8.
In addition, we determinedwhether the lenderwas a bank, insurance company
or pension fund. Our categorization of banks is based on the deﬁnition of Bank-
scope (for banks) and the deﬁnition of the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory
Authority of the Netherlands, the supervising body of insurance companies.
Our gross sample of household data consists of 386,335 mortgages of
dwellings covering all maturities. Figure 1 gives the distribution of the mort-
gages’ ﬁxed interest rate period. The largest class of mortgages is that of a
10-year period with ﬁxed lending rates (154,874 cases or 40% of the gross
sample). We selected these 10-year mortgages. Second, we excluded the cases
for which the income of the head of the household was not reported as well
as the cases for which the mortgages were used to reﬁnance the home. Third,
cases observed in 1995 were excluded, because not all explanatory variables
were available for that year. Finally, cases from October 2001 were excluded
because information on the dates at the end of that month was lacking,
which could affect the analyses with the monthly lending rates in section 4.
Eventually, our sample was reduced to 130,842 cases, that were observed in
the period January 1996 – September 2001 (69 calender months)9. For these
cases, 65% of the mortgages are based on endowment; 32% are other mort-
gages including escrow mortgages; 3% of the mortgages are annuity mort-
gages. In order to have a homogenous type of mortgage (so that there are no
measurement errors due to differences in the type of contract), we restricted
our sample to the endowment mortgages. It leads to a sample of 84,727 cases,
which will be used in section 4 and sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2.
This sample may be distinguished by type of lender, i.e. banks, insurance
companies, and other lenders. Table 1 gives the mortgage distribution by type
of lender in our sample. Banks provide about 70% of the mortgages, insurers
12%, and the other lenders 18%. There are 72 mortgage lenders: 21 banks, 25
insurers and 26 other suppliers (including pension funds).
As indicated above, our sample focuses on the lower part of the Dutch
mortgage market. The distribution of mortgages by type of provider in our
sample may therefore differ from that of Statistics Netherlands for the full
mortgage market (see Table 2). According to Statistics Netherlands, over the
period 1993–2001, the market share of banks increased from 48.6% (1993) to
8 Statistics T3.8.1 Market interest rates, Table 3.1.3.
9 In addition, we omitted a few cases that had an outlier in the lending rate (13 cases with
a lending rate above 15.0% or below 3.0%), the income of the head of household (four cases)
and the partner (two cases), the number of homeowners (six cases), and the premium deposit
(two cases).
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Figure 1 – Distribution of the ﬁxed interest rate period (in years), January 1996–October 2001;
N =386,335
TABLE 1 – MORTGAGES BY TYPE OF LENDER
Lender Number of lenders Number of borrowers Percentage of mortgages
Banks 21 59,434 70%
Insurance companies 25 10,070 12%
Other lenders 26 15,223 18%
Total 72 84,727 100%
nearly 50% (1997 and 1998), and to decline again to 43.8% in 2001. For the
insurance companies, the market share was 15.8% in 1993; it ﬂuctuated in
the subsequent years and dropped to 12.6% in 2001. The remaining suppli-
ers have a market share that increased from 35.6% in 1993 to 43.6% in 2001.
TABLE 2 – MARKET SHARES IN THE DUTCH MORTGAGE MARKET BY LENDER’
TYPE
Banks (%) Insurance companies (%) Other lenders (%)
1993 48.6 15.8 35.6
1994 47.8 15.6 36.6
1995 43.5 12.0 44.6
1996 46.6 12.6 40.9
1997 49.9 15.6 34.5
1998 49.9 13.4 36.6
1999 45.8 14.4 39.8
2000 46.3 13.6 40.1
2001 43.8 12.6 43.6
Source: Statistics Netherlands.
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We will analyse dispersion of the lending rate by type of lender separately.
Our analysis in sub-section 5.3 is based on information of 59,434 mortgages
sold by banks and 25,293 mortgages sold by insurers and pension funds. In
addition, we will distinguish periods in which the bond rate decreased from
periods that had an increase in the bond rate. We constructed a variable
which has the value of one when the bonds’ interest rate goes up compared
with the preceding 2months and the value of zero when this interest rate
decreased compared with the preceding 2months. The bond market interest
rate is used as an exogenous variable that indicates whether the market was
going up or down, which is in line with Toolsema and Jacobs (2001). Den
Butter et al. (1977) and Swank (1995) demonstrate the importance of the cap-
ital market interest rate for the mortgage rate charged.
4 DISPERSION OF THE LENDING RATE
This section examines the dispersion of the lending rate and its development
over time. We consider variation within the month of transaction of the mort-
gage. Even though we use a narrowly deﬁned set of mortgages, we ﬁnd that
the lending rate varies substantially across lenders and borrowers.
4.1 Between-Lender Dispersion
First, we consider the variation in lending rate across lenders. We calculated
the average lending rate, rit , for each of the lenders (subscript i) during that
month (subscript t). For each month, we determined for rit a 95% interval
estimate across all of the lenders. The average width of the interval over all
months is 0.96 percentage point10. It is a ﬁrst indication that the dispersion
of the average lending rate across lenders is quite substantial.
Next, we are interested in the skewness of the distribution of the average
lending rate across the lenders, for which we compare the average and the
median of the distribution. For each month t , we calculated the average of
rit (across lenders) and the median of rit (across lenders) that we refer to as
rt and ξ50t , respectively. The average of rt −ξ50t over all months equals −0.011
percentage point, which indicates that the distribution (across lenders) of the
average monthly lending rate is skewed to the right; it has a tail on the left
hand side of the distribution 11.
Next, we examine the development of the between-lender dispersion of
the lending rate over time. In this respect, we use the median lending rate
(ξ50it ) for each lender and each month. We do not apply the average lending
10 This measure allows us to compare it with the standard deviation of the between-lender
dummies in section 5.
11 The skewness does not change substantially when we consider different regimes of upward
and downward change of the bond rate.























1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Time
 90th percentile, across lenders
 50th percentile, across lenders
 10th percentile, across lenders
Figure 2 – Dispersion of monthly median lending rate; 10th, 50th and 90th percentile (across
lenders)
rate, rit , as the median is less sensitive to outliers. For each month and each
lender, we calculated the median lending rate ξ50it across its borrowers. For
each month, we determined the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the median
lending rate ξ50it across the distribution of lenders. Figure 2 shows the devel-
opment of these three percentiles over time. The difference of the 90th and the
10th percentile of the median lending rate is a measure of the between-lender
dispersion 12. The average of this difference over all months is 0.56 percentage
point.
The ﬁgure shows that the median lending rate decreased from about 7%
to about 5% over the period January 1996–July 1999. July 1999 is a turning
point; from then on the median lending rate increased by about one percent-
age point to 6% in a few months. From January 2000 onwards, the median
lending rate remained stable at the 6% level. With respect to the difference
of the 90th and the 10th percentile, we notice two regimes. In the ﬁrst regime
of decreasing lending rates (until July 1999), the average difference was 0.52
percentage point. The difference increased to 0.64 percentage point in the sec-
ond regime of an increasing rate at the market level. The widening of the dis-
persion may point at higher price competition of the lenders to increase their
market share in times of increasing lending rates.
4.2 Within Lender-Dispersion
Next, we consider the dispersion of the lending rate at the borrower level. For
each month and each lender, we calculated the difference of the average lend-
ing rate and the median lending rate (rit − ξ50it ). The average of this differ-
ence across all lenders and months is relatively small but negative (−0.0046
12 We did not take the minimum and maximum of the median lending rate, so that the out-
comes are less sensitive to outliers.
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Figure 3 – Kernel estimate of monthly within-lender dispersion of lending rate; at least two
borrowers per montha) a) Explanatory note: We applied an Epanechnikov density Kernel (see
Footnote 13)
percentage point for 3,087 observations; it remains about the same when we
distinguish between regimes of upward and downward changes of the bond
rate). It implies that the distribution of the lending rate within lenders is not
fully symmetric; the distribution has a tail on the left-hand side.
We consider the difference between the 90th and the 10th percentile of the
lending rate across the borrowers, (ξ90it −ξ10it ) for each lender and each period.
It gives us a measure of the within-lender dispersion. Figure 3 gives an esti-
mate of the distribution of the within-lender dispersion across the lenders.
We applied a Kernel estimator13, for which we used those monthly observa-
tions for which the lender had at least two borrowers during the month (2,547
observations). It appears that the modus of the within-lender dispersion
ξ90it − ξ10it is about 0.3 percentage point. A comparison of the between-lender
dispersion (Figure 2) and the within-lender dispersion (Figure 3) indicates
that the dispersion is smaller within lenders (among borrowers) than between
lenders.
Figure 4 shows the development of the within-lender dispersion over time.
We are interested in two percentiles across the distribution of lenders: the
lenders that have a relatively small or large within-dispersion of the lending
rate. For each month, we determined the 10th percentile and the 90th percen-
tile of the within-lender dispersion, using the same monthly observations as
in Figure 3. Remarkably, the within-lender dispersion ﬂuctuates substantially
over time. In particular, around 2000, when there was a rapid increase in the
13 The Kernel density estimator is a nonparametric density estimator (e.g. Cameron and Triv-
idi, 2005, pp. 298–306). We applied an Epanechnikov Kernel, with a range of 0–2.0 percentage
point and a bandwith of 0.125 percentage point.
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Figure 4 – Development over time of monthly within-lender dispersion of lending rate; at least
two borrowers per month




The purpose of this section is to estimate the between-lender dispersion of
the lending rate, conditional on the observed characteristics of the borrow-
ers, their property and the opportunity costs of investment. Basically, it boils
down to estimating the size of the between-lender variation from equation (4).
This sub-section motivates the inclusion of the explanatory variables in the
vector X in equation (4). The choice of our explanatory variables is based
on the micro-econometric studies of Duca and Rosenthal (1994), Chiang and
Chow (2002) and Nothaft and Perry (2002). The descriptive statistics of the
explanatory variables are given in Table 3. As motivated in section 3, we make
use of the data of endowment mortgages (84,727 observations). For these
data, the average lending rate is 6.02%. Seventy percent of the borrowers pur-
chased their mortgage from a bank.
We ﬁrst discuss the characteristics of the borrowers. Inclusion of the value
of the home, the gross income variables and the value of the mortgage jointly
(all of these variables in logarithms) would lead to severe problems of mul-
ticollinearity, as these variables are strongly correlated. Instead, we included
both the (logarithm of the) value of the mortgage loan relative to that of the
home, the so-called loan-to-value ratio, and the (logarithm of the) mortgage
loan relative to the gross household income (refered to as the loan-to-income
ratio). Moreover, we included the (logarithm of the) gross household income
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TABLE 3 – DESCRIPTIVES; ENDOWMENT MORTGAGES; FIXED LENDING RATE OF
10YEARS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Characteristics of mortgage
Lending rate (in percentages) 6.02 0.65 3.25 10.00
Dummy bank 0.70 0.46 0 1
Characteristics of borrower
Log(value of mortgage) 12.34 0.335 9.68 12.95
Log(gross income of head household) 10.82 0.32 7.48 13.73
Log(gross income of partner + 1) 6.31 5.16 0 13.45
Loan/(value of home) 1.02 0.13 0.09 1.92
Loan/(gross income head + gross income partner) 3.23 0.65 0.01 8.51
Dummy age ≤25 years 0.19 0.39 0 1
Dummy 25 < age ≤ 30 years 0.40 0.49 0 1
Dummy 30 < age ≤ 35 years 0.22 0.41 0 1
Dummy 35 < age ≤ 40 years 0.10 0.30 0 1
Dummy 40 < age ≤ 45 years 0.05 0.22 0 1
Dummy 45 < age ≤ 50 years 0.03 0.16 0 1
Dummy age > 50 years 0.01 0.10 0 1
Dummy one borrower 0.29 0.45 0 1
Log(instalment payments + 1) 4.96 5.52 0 12.24
Log(premium deposit + 1) 0.81 2.52 0 12.04
Characteristics of home
Dummy existing home 0.84 0.37 0 1
Dummy apartment 0.20 0.40 0 1
Dummy back repair of the home 0.04 0.19 0 1
Characteristics of municipality
Population density per square kilometre (in thousands) 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.65
Number of inhabitants (in ten thousands) 1.08 1.43 0.01 7.27
Log(average value of homes) (in thousands of guilders) 5.10 0.22 4.47 6.12
Benchmark interest rate
Interest on 10-year government bonds (at
date of purchase of mortgage) 5.24 0.61 3.73 6.58
Number of observations 84,727
both for the head of the household and for the partner14. Both the loan-
to-value ratio and the loan-to-income ratio are informative about the risk of
prepayment (since there is no risk of default as this is covered by the NMG-
insurance). Lenders require a higher lending rate when households have a
higher risk of prepayment. A lower loan-to-value ratio leads to an increase
in the risk of prepayment, so that there will be a higher lending rate, as the
borrower becomes more attractive for competing lenders. A higher loan-to-
income ratio leads to a higher risk of prepayment, because borrowers have
14 Inclusion of the log(loan-to-value), the log(loan-to-income) and log(income) makes it
possible to identify the effects of log(income), log(loan) and log(value) separately.
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more to gain from prepayment when the loan is relatively high compared with
their income. The average loan-to-value ratio is 1.022; the loan-to-income
ratio is on average 3.232 (see Table 3).
Although the NMG-insurance imposes no constraint on the household
income, the households are from the lower segment of the income distribution,
as this insurance is aimed at the lower part of the home market (see section 3).
The average value of the mortgage is 237 thousand guilders (in logs: 12.34).
The average gross income of the head of the household is about 52 thousand
guilders (average of log: 10.82)15. For the partner of the head of the house-
hold, the average gross income is about 24 thousand guilders (average of log:
6.31)16,17.
On average, the homebuyers are young; 59% of the borrowers are at most
30-years-old. This may be due to the segment of the housing market the
NMG-insurance focuses its activities on, since young people buy relatively
more homes in this segment. 29% of the mortgages have one borrower only.
The average value of the instalment payments is about 37 thousand guilders
(average of log: 4.96). The average value of the premium deposit is 930 guil-
ders (average of log: 0.81)18.
The characteristics of the home provide information on whether the prop-
erty is new, whether it is an apartment, and whether the home needs back
repair. 84% of the mortgages are used for existing homes, 20% are used for
apartments and 4% of the mortgaged homes need back repair.
We used various characteristics of the municipality, which refer to the sit-
uation on 1 January 1999. On average, there are about 170 inhabitants per
square kilometre (so the major part of the households live in non-urbanized
areas). On average, a municipality has around 10,800 inhabitants. The average
value of the homes in the municipality, on which local taxes are based, is 168
thousand guilders (average of log: 5.1) on 1 January 1995. On average, the
interest rate on 10-year bonds is 5.1%, which is about 0.9 percentage point
lower than the average lending rate.
Table 4 gives the means and standard deviations of these variables for the
mortages sold by banks (59,434 cases) and by insurers and pension funds
(25,293 cases) separately. The differences between both types of lender seem
15 In the Netherlands, homeowners receive tax reduction on their interest rate costs of the
mortgage. The degree of tax reduction depends on the marginal tax rate. The marginal tax
rates were 33%, 42%, and 62% in the period 1996–2000. In 2001, the marginal tax rates were
37%, 42%, and 52%.
16 About one third of the borrowers has no partner with an income; therefore, the differ-
ence between the log of the average gross income of the partner and the average of the log
is quite substantial.
17 In this section the averages of the prices are calculated for the untransformed variables.
Table 3 gives the averages of the transformed variables.
18 About 50% of the borrowers have an installment premium; about 30% of the borrowers
have a premium deposit.
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TABLE 4 – DESCRIPTIVES DISTINGUISHED BY TYPE OF LENDER
Variable Banks Insurance companies
and pension funds
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Characteristics of mortgage
Lending rate (in percentages) 5.93 0.65 6.23 0.60
Characteristics of borrower
Log(value of mortgage) 12.33 0.31 12.29 0.30
Log(gross income of head household) 10.82 0.33 10.79 0.31
Log(gross income of partner + 1) 6.27 5.17 6.41 5.13
Loan/(value of home) 1.02 0.13 1.02 0.13
Loan/(gross income head + gross income
partner)
3.27 0.66 3.14 0.62
Dummy age ≤ 25 years 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39
Dummy 25 < age ≤ 30 years 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49
Dummy 30 < age ≤ 35 years 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42
Dummy 35 < age ≤ 40 years 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.30
Dummy 40 < age ≤ 45 years 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21
Dummy 45 < age ≤ 50 years 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14
Dummy age > 50 years 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09
Dummy one borrower 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44
Log(instalment payments + 1) 5.31 5.63 4.13 5.39
Log(premium deposit + 1) 0.98 2.72 0.41 1.90
Characteristics of home
Dummy existing home 0.83 0.38 0.86 0.35
Dummy apartment 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40
Dummy back repair of the home 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.16
Characteristics of municipality
Population density per square kilometre (in
thousands)
0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17
Number of inhabitants (in ten thousands) 1.07 1.43 1.10 1.42
Log(average value of homes) (in thousands
of guilders)
5.09 0.22 5.11 0.21
Benchmark interest rate
Interest on 10-year government bonds (at
date of purchase of mortgage)
5.15 0.59 5.44 0.60
Number of observations 59,434 25,293
to be rather small for most of the variables. The nominal lending rate is some-
what lower for the banks than for the insurers and pension funds, but this
could be due to different days of observation. Banks and insurance compa-
nies and pension funds have an equal difference between the lending rate and
the interest on 10-year government bonds.
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TABLE 5 – ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (4); DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LENDING
RATE; ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS
Explanatory variable Parameter t-value
Characteristics of borrower
Log(income of head household) −0.033 −8.50∗∗
Log(income of partner + 1) −0.003 −8.43∗∗
Log[Loan/(value of home)] −0.117 −19.52∗∗
Log[Loan/(gross income head + gross income partner)] 0.009 1.14
Dummy age ≤ 25 years a) 0.002 0.16
Dummy 25 < age ≤ 30 years −0.010 −0.86
Dummy 30 < age ≤ 35 years −0.007 −0.63
Dummy 35 < age ≤ 40 years −0.005 −0.47
Dummy 40 < age ≤ 45 years 0.001 0.05
Dummy 45 < age ≤ 50 years −0.010 −0.75
Dummy more than one borrower b) −0.015 −3.99∗∗
Log(instalment payments + 1) 0.001 7.36∗∗
Log(premium deposit + 1) 0.003 7.18∗∗
Characteristics of home
Dummy existing home c) 0.103 35.33∗∗
Dummy apartment d) 0.002 0.63
Dummy back repair of the home e) 0.007 1.47
Characteristics of municipality
Population density per square kilometre 0.047 5.59∗∗
Number of inhabitants 0.001 0.88
Log(average value of homes) 0.007 1.22
Benchmark interest rate




F -test on age class (six dummies) 3.40∗∗
F -test on calendar month (68 dummies) 1090∗∗
F -test on lender effects (71 dummies) 140∗∗
Number of observations 84,727
a) Reference group: age over 50 years.
b) Reference group: one borrower.
c) Reference group: new homes.
d) Reference group: remaining homes, other than apartments.
e) Reference group: no back repair of home.
∗∗Statistically different from zero at 1% level.
5.2 Transparency of the Market
We estimated equation (4) using the explanatory variables discussed in the
previous sub-section. Table 5 presents the ﬁxed-effect estimates (72 lenders),
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for which, additionally, 68 dummies of the calendar month were included19.
The dispersion of the estimated parameters of the lender-speciﬁc dummy vari-
ables is quite substantial. The standard deviation of the estimated coefﬁcients
on these dummy variables, σa , is 0.152. Hence, the dispersion of the lending
rate across lenders that we observed in section 4 is still prevalent after cor-
recting for the other explanatory variables. Reformulated, a 95% interval esti-
mate of the lender-speciﬁc coefﬁcients (across the lenders) is 0.61 percentage
point20. This variation is 0.35 percentage point smaller than the 95% interval
estimate of the average lending rate (across the lenders), which is 0.96 per-
centage point (see section 4). These results are close to the results found by
Heffernan (2002), who ﬁnds for the UK a price dispersion of 0.45 percent-
age point for new borrowers. In her sample, both banks and non-banks, such
as building societies and ‘community’ building societies, are included. Fur-
thermore, she uses interest rates quoted before the actual decision on type of
mortgage is made. In that respect, this study is also very comparable to our
approach of using one type of mortgage.
Another estimation result is that σa (0.152) is smaller than the standard
deviation of the error term (σv = 0.294), which is not in line with our ﬁnd-
ings of section 4. It implies that dispersion of the lending rate across lenders
is larger than the dispersion within lenders.
Ideally, in our regressions we would like to take into account all borrower’s
characteristics as observed by the lender. It could be that lenders have infor-
mation available on the quality of the borrowers (e.g. profession, which is
not included in the data set we used). Although these unobserved character-
istics affect price dispersion between borrowers, these characteristics will only
affect the price dispersion between lenders when individual lenders would tar-
get speciﬁc groups of borrowers. For this we have no indications.
Next, we discuss the estimated coefﬁcients on the remaining explanatory
variables. The logarithm of the loan-to-value ratio has a statistically signiﬁ-
cant coefﬁcient. The value of −0.117 indicates that a 10% increase of the
loan-to-value ratio leads to a decrease of the lending rate by 0.012 percentage
point, so that borrowers who are more restricted have a lower lending rate.
Apparently, borrowers with a higher loan-to-value ratio have a lower prepay-
ment risk (as mentioned before, the NMG-insurance leads to an absence of
the risk of default).
The loan-to-income ratio is statistically insigniﬁcant. We can identify the
separate effect of income: A 10% increase in the income of the head of the
household leads to a decrease in lending rate by 0.0033 percentage point.
For the income of the partner, this effect is even about ten times smaller. In
19 We do not include additional lender-speciﬁc explanatory variables, as these effects will be
picked up by the lender dummies.
20 Four times the standard deviation of the ﬁxed effect. The standard deviation is measured
in terms of percentage points.
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addition, an increase of the mortgage loan by 10% leads to a decrease in the
lending rate by 0.012 percentage point; whereas an increase of the value of
the home by 10% leads to an increase in the lending rate by 0.012 percentage
point.
With respect to the borrower’s characteristics, the F -test indicates that the
age dummies are jointly signiﬁcantly different from zero. However, the coefﬁ-
cients on the dummies are individually insigniﬁcant and no clear pattern
emerges from the estimated coefﬁcients. It indicates that there is no indication
for third-degree price discrimination between age groups.
The home variables may provide some indication about the impact of col-
lateral. The lending rate is 0.103 percentage point higher for existing homes.
For apartments and back repair of the home we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant estimated
coefﬁcients. These ﬁndings imply that the value of the collateral reduces the
lending rate. Newly built homes have a higher value. These ﬁndings are in line
with the results of Wette (1983). Nothaft and Perry (2002) show that neigh-
bourhoods with new homes have lower lending rates. The estimates imply that
borrowers in highly populated areas have higher lending rates, but from an
economic point of view this effect is very small.
The estimated coefﬁcient on the interest on bonds is 0.07: A 1-percentage
point increase in the interest rate on bonds leads to an increase in the lend-
ing rate by 0.07 percentage point, ceteris paribus on all explanatory variables
(included the monthly calendar dummies)21. This coefﬁcient is very small
when we compare it with previous estimates for the Dutch mortgage mar-
ket. Den Butter et al. (1977, pp. 59) estimate the effect of the bond rate on
the lending rate of mortgages (homes and other mortgages), for which they
use quarterly data over the period 1960:II-1974:I. The estimated parameter on
the bond rate is 0.718. Swank (1995) obtains a value of 0.67 for the effect
of the government long-term bond yield on the mortgage lending rate, for
which he uses annual data over the period 1957–1990. The difference between
our estimate of 0.07 with those of the two aformentioned studies could be
explained by the fact that we measure the 10-year bond rate at a daily level,
whereas Den Butter et al. (1977) and Swank (1995) measure the bond yield at
a quarterly and annual level, respectively. Our estimation results suggest that
the effect of the bond rate becomes substantially smaller when allowing for
variation at the daily level.
5.3 Middlemen
We argued in section 2 that banks may have lower agency costs, because of
previous ﬁnancial transactions with the borrowers. In contrast, agency costs
are higher for insurers and pension funds, since they get their information
21 When we exclude the 68 calendar month dummies, the estimated coefﬁcient on the gov-
ernment bonds becomes 0.79.
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TABLE 6 – ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (4); DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LENDING
RATE; DISTINGUISHED BY BANKS AND INSURERS AND PENSION FUNDS;
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS
Explanatory variable Banks Insurance companies,
pension funds
Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Characteristics of borrower
Log(income of head household) −0.038 −8.17∗∗ −0.021 −3.05∗∗
Log(income of partner + 1) −0.004 −8.53∗∗ −0.002 −2.52∗∗
Log[Loan/(value of home)] −0.124 −17.17∗∗ −0.102 −9.71∗∗
Log[Loan/(gross income head +
gross income partner)] 0.007 0.71 0.020 1.54
Dummy age ≤ 25 years a) −0.009 −0.64 0.033 1.61
Dummy 25 < age ≤ 30 years −0.023 −1.68 0.025 1.25
Dummy 30 < age ≤ 35 years −0.019 −1.40 0.025 1.26
Dummy 35 < age ≤ 40 years −0.021 −1.54 0.037 1.81
Dummy 40 < age ≤ 45 years −0.009 −0.63 0.025 1.16
Dummy 45 < age ≤ 50 years −0.019 −1.25 0.015 0.64
Dummy more than one borrower b) −0.012 −2.77∗∗ −0.019 −3.12∗∗
Log(instalment payments + 1) 0.001 5.89∗∗ 0.001 2.82∗∗
Log(premium deposit + 1) 0.003 6.32∗∗ 0.003 3.20∗∗
Characteristics of home
Dummy existing home c) 0.105 29.79∗∗ 0.091 18.10∗∗
Dummy apartment d) 0.001 0.21 −0.004 −0.72
Dummy back repair of the home e) 0.004 0.68 0.014 1.42
Characteristics of municipality
Population density per square kilometre 0.053 5.07∗∗ 0.039 2.83∗∗
Number of inhabitants 0.002 1.56 −0.001 −0.62
Log(average value of homes) 0.010 1.47 0.002 0.17
Benchmark interest rate
Interest on 10-year government
bonds (at date of purchase of mortgage) 0.082 4.93∗∗ 0.038 1.67
Intercept 6.773 56.46∗∗ 5.189 42.33∗∗
σa 0.117 0.162
σv 0.303 0.267
F -test on age class (six dummies) 3.65∗∗ 1.55
F -test on calendar month (68 dummies) 843∗∗ 98∗∗
F -test on lender effects (20 dummies:
banks; 50 dummies: other lenders) 237∗∗ 230∗∗
R-squared 0.785 0.805
Number of observations 59,434 25,293
a) Reference group: age over 50 years. b) Reference group: one borrower. c) Reference group: new
homes. d) Reference group: remaining homes other than apartments. e) Reference group: no back
repair of home. ∗∗Statistically different from zero at 1% level.
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through middlemen only. We estimated equation (4) for the category banks
(21 lenders) and the category insurers and pension funds (51 lenders) sep-
arately (see Table 6). We ﬁnd that σa is smaller for banks (0.117) than for
insurers and pension funds (0.162). This difference indicates that lenders that
make use of middlemen only may have higher agency costs. In contrast, we
ﬁnd that σv is larger for banks than for insurers and pension funds (0.303 ver-
sus 0.267). A likely explanation for the larger residual variation for banks is
that they have applied additional characteristics of the borrower that are not
captured by the administrative information that we use in the regression equa-
tion. Probably, part of this additional information may be collected through
previous contacts with the borrower.
With respect to the effects of the other explanatory variables, the differ-
ences between banks and the other lenders are not very substantial, except for
the effect of the interest on 10-year government bonds. Our estimates imply
that for banks, an increase in the bond rate by 1 percentage point leads to
an increase in the lending rate of 0.082 percentage point. Since banks attract
funds mainly from the bond market, the bond rate represents the marginal
costs of attracting funding to ﬁnance mortgages for banks. For the insur-
ers and pension funds the estimated coefﬁcient is not statistically different
from zero. The coefﬁcient on the bond rate has a different interpretation for
insurance companies, as they mainly invest in the bond market in contrast to
banks that mainly attract funds from the bond market. Here the bond rate
reﬂects their opportunity costs of alternative investments in bonds (Boshuizen
and Pijpers, 2000).
Next, we consider the differences between the lenders for a period of
decrease in the lending rate (44months) and a period of increase in the lend-
ing rate at the market level (25months). According to the estimates, σa is
smaller for banks than for the other lenders when there is a decrease in the
lending rate (0.112 versus 0.168 percentage point, which can be recalculated
as a 95% interval estimate: 0.45 and 0.67 percentage point, respectively). See
the ﬁrst columns of Tables 7 and 8. It may indicate that agency costs are
lower for banks than for other lenders that make use of middlemen only.
The estimated error term σv is somewhat larger for banks than for the
other lenders (0.265 versus 0.296 percentage point), which may reﬂect that
in their assessment of the creditworthiness of borrowers, banks made use of
additional information that is not captured by the administrative information.
6 CONCLUSION
The empirical results in this paper have opened an avenue towards a new
type of empirical microeconomic research of the Dutch mortgage market.
This type of research registers and explains dispersion of lending rates across
lenders. For a narrowly deﬁned set of endowment mortgages (ﬁxed rate for
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TABLE 7 – ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (4); DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LENDING
RATE; BANKS DISTINGUISHED BY CHANGE IN MARKET LENDING RATE;
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS
Explanatory variable Decrease in market Increase in market
lending rate lending rate
Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Characteristics of borrower
Log(income of head household) −0.033 −5.72∗∗ −0.045 −5.88∗∗
Log(income of partner + 1) −0.004 −6.55∗∗ −0.004 −5.30∗∗
Log[Loan/(value of home)] −0.117 −12.92∗∗ −0.134 −11.36∗∗
Log[Loan/(gross income head + gross
income partner)] −0.006 −0.48 0.026 1.72
Dummy age ≤ 25 yearsa) 0.002 0.12 −0.028 −1.43
Dummy 25 < age ≤ 30 years −0.015 −0.81 −0.037 −1.93
Dummy 30 < age ≤ 35 years −0.009 −0.51 −0.037 −1.89
Dummy 35 < age ≤ 40 years −0.014 −0.73 −0.034 −1.72
Dummy 40 < age ≤ 45 years −0.002 −0.08 −0.023 −1.11
Dummy 45 < age ≤ 50 years −0.002 −0.09 −0.047 −2.13∗
Dummy more than one borrowerb) −0.016 −2.80∗∗ −0.007 −0.89
Log(instalment payments + 1) 0.001 4.69∗∗ 0.001 3.39∗∗
Log(premium deposit + 1) 0.004 6.31∗∗ 0.002 2.29∗
Characteristics of home
Dummy existing homec) 0.104 23.85∗∗ 0.105 17.68∗∗
Dummy apartmentd) 0.004 0.78 −0.004 −0.61
Dummy back repair of the homee) 0.002 0.22 0.008 0.85
Characteristics of municipality
Population density per square kilometre 0.047 3.76∗∗ 0.060 3.32∗∗
Number of inhabitants 0.001 0.92 0.003 1.33
Log(average value of homes) 0.013 1.54 0.004 0.38
Benchmark interest rate
Interest on 10-year government bonds (at
date of purchase of mortgage) 0.079 3.81∗∗ 0.082 2.98∗∗
Intercept 5.163 48.24∗∗ 6.818 33.54∗∗
σa 0.112 0.160
σv 0.296 0.312
F -test on age class (six dummies) 3.28∗∗ 1.44
F -test on calendar month (43 dummies:
decrease; 24 dummies: increase) 372∗∗ 965∗∗
F -test on lender effects (20 dummies) 172∗∗ 75∗∗
R-squared 0.745 0.816
Number of observations 36,455 22,979
a) Reference group: age over 50 years. b) Reference group: one borrower. c) Reference group: new
homes. d) Reference group: remaining homes other than apartments. e) Reference group: no back
repair of home. ∗Statistically different from zero at 5% level. ∗∗Statistically different from zero at
1% level.
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TABLE 8 – ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (4); DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LENDING
RATE; INSURERS AND PENSION FUNDS DISTINGUISHED BY CHANGE IN MAR-
KET LENDING RATE; ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS




Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Characteristics of borrower
Log(income of head household) −0.019 −2.32∗ −0.024 −2.14∗
Log(income of partner + 1) −0.001 −1.89 −0.002 −1.87
Log[Loan/(value of home)] −0.097 −7.42∗∗ −0.111 −6.34∗∗
Log[Loan/(gross income head + gross
income partner)] 0.011 0.67 0.038 1.68
Dummy age ≤ 25 yearsa) 0.023 0.96 0.047 1.33
Dummy 25 < age ≤ 30 years 0.023 0.95 0.027 0.76
Dummy 30 < age ≤ 35 years 0.023 0.98 0.027 0.75
Dummy 35 < age ≤ 40 years 0.039 1.59 0.033 0.91
Dummy 40 < age ≤ 45 years 0.018 0.71 0.036 0.97
Dummy 45 < age ≤ 50 years 0.005 0.19 0.026 0.66
Dummy more than one borrowerb) −0.024 −3.15∗∗ −0.009 −0.89
Log(instalment payments + 1) 0.001 2.58∗∗ 0.001 1.49
Log(premium deposit + 1) 0.003 3.14∗∗ 0.002 1.22
Characteristics of home
Dummy existing homec) 0.092 14.49∗∗ 0.087 10.52∗∗
Dummy apartmentd) 0.000 −0.03 −0.012 −1.32
Dummy back repair of the homee) 0.011 0.87 0.018 1.13
Characteristics of municipality
Population density per square kilometre 0.047 2.81∗∗ 0.027 1.09
Number of inhabitants −0.002 −1.20 0.002 0.63
Log(average value of homes) 0.000 −0.01 0.005 0.33
Benchmark interest rate
Interest on 10-year government bonds
(at date of purchase of mortgage) 0.031 1.08 0.046 1.27
Intercept 6.910 34.39∗∗ 4.986 24.50∗∗
σa 0.168 0.161
σv 0.265 0.268
F -test on age class (six dummies) 1.34 1.35
F -test on calendar month (43 dummies:
decrease; 24 dummies: increase) 139∗∗ 228∗∗
F -test on lender effects (50 dummies) 276∗∗ 25∗∗
R-squared 0.767 0.853
Number of observations 16,727 8,566
a) Reference group: age over 50 years. b) Reference group: one borrower. c) Reference group: new
homes. d) Reference group: remaining homes other than apartments. e) Reference group: no back
repair of home. ∗Statistically different from zero at 5% level. ∗∗Statistically different from zero at
1% level.
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10 years), we ﬁnd that a 95% interval estimate of the monthly average lend-
ing rate across lenders is about 0.96 percentage point. However, dispersion
within lenders (across borrowers) is larger than the variation between lend-
ers. In addition, the interval estimate reduces to 0.61 percentage point, after
correcting for the underlying borrowers’ characteristics, the municipality and
the government bond rate.
Price dispersion may hint at the presence of imperfect competition, caused
by search costs of borrowers or by agency costs of lenders. In general, this
points to a lack of transparency, which impedes competition on the mortgage
market. We observe substantial differences in price dispersion between the
mortgages of banks on the one hand and the mortgages of insurers and pen-
sion funds on the other. After correcting for the household and municipality
characteristics, we ﬁnd that the dispersion of the lending rate across lenders
is smaller for the banks (95% interval estimate: 0.45 percentage point) than
for the other lenders that make use of middlemen only (95% interval esti-
mate: 0.67 percentage point). This difference may be caused by a difference
in agency costs between banks and insurers due to unobserved characteris-
tics of the lenders. Banks are able to screen borrowers more thoroughly, as
they have relatively more direct contact with their borrowers, whereas insur-
ers and pension funds make use of middlemen, who may screen the borrowers
less effectively.
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